A Contextual Account of Explanation in Logic
Recent approaches to the epistemology of logic, under the title of “anti-exceptionalism about logic”, explicitly adopt what is asserted to be the method of theory choice and the correct account of explanation in the sciences. Without embracing such a doctrine, but still keeping within a broad anti-e...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
| Repositorio: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/98374 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/98374 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Logic Epistemology Explanation Anti-exceptionalism Bas van Fraassen |
| Sumario: | Recent approaches to the epistemology of logic, under the title of “anti-exceptionalism about logic”, explicitly adopt what is asserted to be the method of theory choice and the correct account of explanation in the sciences. Without embracing such a doctrine, but still keeping within a broad anti-exceptional trend, the current discussion proposes a contextual theory of explanation in logic, based on Bas van Fraassen’s framework of why-questions, which neither claims that logic is a science, nor relies on the metaphysical assumption of a validity-phenomenon to give account of the methodology of logic. |
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