Brentano and the Ideality of Time
How is it possible to have present memory experiences of things that, being past, are no longer presently experienced? A possible answer to this long-standing philosophical question is what I call the “ideality of time view,” namely the view that temporal succession is unreal. In this paper I outlin...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
| Repositorio: | Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/42918 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/article/view/42918 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Brentano. Tempo. Hume. Intencionalidade. Brentano. Time. Hume. Intentionality. |
| Resumo: | How is it possible to have present memory experiences of things that, being past, are no longer presently experienced? A possible answer to this long-standing philosophical question is what I call the “ideality of time view,” namely the view that temporal succession is unreal. In this paper I outline the basic idea behind Brentano’s version of the ideality of time view. Additionally, I contrast it with Hume’s version, suggesting that, despite significant differences, it can nonetheless be construed as broadly Humean. |
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