Reason and irrationality in the representation of knowledge
How is it possible that beginning from the negation of rational thoughts (i.e. from the failure in the representation of knowledge, taking place through the presence of contradictory informations) one comes to produce knowledge? This problem, besides its intrinsic interest, acquires a great relevanc...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1991 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
| Repositorio: | Trans/Form/Ação (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.www2.marilia.unesp.br:article/12315 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/12315 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Inconsistency and triviality paraconsistent logics meta systems semantics of paraconsistent logics semantics of possible translations Inconsistência e trivialidade Lógicas Paraconsistentes Sistema Meta Semântica das Lógicas Paraconsistentes Semântica das Traduções Possíveis |
| Sumario: | How is it possible that beginning from the negation of rational thoughts (i.e. from the failure in the representation of knowledge, taking place through the presence of contradictory informations) one comes to produce knowledge? This problem, besides its intrinsic interest, acquires a great relevance when the representation of a knowledge is settled, for example, on data and automatic reasoning. Many treatment ways have been tried, as in the case of the non-monotonic logics; logics that intend to formalize an idea of reasoning by default, etc. These attempts are incomplete and are subject to failure. A possible solution would be to formulate a logic of the irrational, which offers a model for reasoning permitting to support contradictions as well as to produce knowledge from such situations. An intuition underlying the foundation of such a logic consists of the da Costa's paraconsistent logics presenting however, a different deduction theory and a whole distinct semantics, called here "the semantics of possible translations". The present proposing, following our argumentation, intends to enlight all this question, by a whole satisfactory logical point of view, being practically applicable and philosophically acceptable. |
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