A crítica ao nominalismo na filosofia de Charles Sanders Peirce

Master's dissertation with the objective of exposing Peirce's criticism to nominalism. The first chapter takes as a starting point of the controversy between Duns Scotus and Guilherme Ockham, as well as an analysis by Peirce of such dispute, proceeding with the implications of nominalism t...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Freire, Guilherme Frassetto da Cunha Lima
Tipo de recurso: tesis de maestría
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2020
País:Brasil
Institución:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
Repositorio:Repositório Institucional da PUC_SP
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.pucsp.br:handle/23165
Acceso en línea:https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/23165
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Nominalismo
Filosofia americana
Filosofia medieval
Peirce, Charles Sanders [1839-1914] - Crítica e interpretação
Nominalism
Philosophy, American
Philosophy, Medieval
Peirce, Charles Sanders [1839-1914] - Criticism and interpretation
CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
Descripción
Sumario:Master's dissertation with the objective of exposing Peirce's criticism to nominalism. The first chapter takes as a starting point of the controversy between Duns Scotus and Guilherme Ockham, as well as an analysis by Peirce of such dispute, proceeding with the implications of nominalism to the history of philosophy. The second chapter deals with Peirce's phenomenology and scientific metaphysics, highlighting the difference between the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness and nominalist’s view that deny universals. The third chapter deals with the evolutionary, synechist and ty-chist views of Peirce, highlighting Peirce's rejection of the denial of of continuity in favor of an evolutionary cosmology, considering how Peirce sees an oposition between this view and nominalism. In the fourth chapter, we discuss an opposition between modern science and nominalism, with the implications to semiotics, logic and scientific method that this entails. We conclude by affirming the centrality of Peirce's critique of nominal-ism within his work