Attention and Cognition in Peter of John Olivi
Peter John Olivi (1248 / 9-1298) supports the idea that intentional attention must be the condition for the active performance of perceptual cognitive act. The intentionality is a natural component of sensory apprehension. In Olivi it requires an active nature of the soul, since the intentional perf...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
| Repositorio: | Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/27300 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/27300 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Perceptual Cognition. Attention. Peter John Olivi. Intentionality. Cognição Perceptual. Atenção. Pedro de João Olivi. Intencionalidade. |
| Resumo: | Peter John Olivi (1248 / 9-1298) supports the idea that intentional attention must be the condition for the active performance of perceptual cognitive act. The intentionality is a natural component of sensory apprehension. In Olivi it requires an active nature of the soul, since the intentional performance is essential to the soul and it is independent of intermediate representational elements such as species. Olivi does not reduce the cognitive act to active or passive mode of action, but adds the terminative cause as a function of object in the act of production. Then, the termination is crucial to show how cognitive attention is classified as intentional. Finally, this article concludes that intentional attention as the pre-experiential condition guarantees immediate access to the objects of the external world. |
|---|