Mill’s view about rights and the Rawls’ criticisms
The purpose of this article is to articulate an interpretation of Mill's theory about the foundation of rights that is capable of responding to Rawls' criticisms. First, the most general aspects of Mill's view of rights are presented. Then, the interpretation of the Millian thesis is...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
| Repositorio: | Ethic@ - Revista Internacional de Filosofia da Moral |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/87871 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/87871 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Justificação de direitos Mill Utilitarismo Rawls Justification of rights Utilitarianism |
| Resumo: | The purpose of this article is to articulate an interpretation of Mill's theory about the foundation of rights that is capable of responding to Rawls' criticisms. First, the most general aspects of Mill's view of rights are presented. Then, the interpretation of the Millian thesis is articulated, taking into account Rawls' criticism that utilitarianism cannot justify rights. It is concluded that the Millian thesis is capable of attributing rights equally, that they have the reasonable moral force, and that the theory is capable of attributing legal rights based on a single principle. |
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