Denying the Existence of Consensus or Denying its Probative Value? A Critique of McIntyre’s Proposal Concerning Science Denial
In this article, we try to argue, against McIntyre’s proposal in How to talk to a science denier, that there is a relevant difference between various forms of science denialism. Specifically, we contend that there is a significant distinction to be made between those forms of denialism which deny th...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Estado: | Versão publicada |
| Data de publicação: | 2024 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
| Repositório: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/93904 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/93904 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Science Denial "Tobacco Strategy" AGW Denial Flat-Eartherism Anti-Vaxxerism McIntyre, Lee |
| Resumo: | In this article, we try to argue, against McIntyre’s proposal in How to talk to a science denier, that there is a relevant difference between various forms of science denialism. Specifically, we contend that there is a significant distinction to be made between those forms of denialism which deny the existence of an expert consensus (the model of which is the strategy of the tobacco companies in the 1950s) and those which deny the probatory value of such expert consensus (on the basis, e.g., of conspiracy theories involving scientists). While McIntyre and others advocate for the value of communicating consensus as an effective and perfectly rational strategy against those forms of denialism which deceivingly deny the existence of scientific agreement, we argue that this approach becomes question-begging against those which deny its probatory value. Accordingly, then, we object to McIntyre’s characterization that “all science denial is basically the same” and suggest a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon. |
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