Civil disobedience: a dispute of concepts
Adopting a genealogical methodology, this paper aims to unveil the historical intricacies of civil disobedience’s many conceptualizations, particularly the ones related to the Thoureaivian concept and the liberal model of civil disobedience. As suggested by Hanson, there has been a long process of s...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
| Repositorio: | (Des)troços - Revista de pensamento radical |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/44936 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/revistadestrocos/article/view/44936 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Desobediência civil Henry David Thoreau modelo liberal de desobediência civil desobediência civil radical ação política civil disobedience liberal model of civil disobedience radical civil disobedience political action |
| Sumario: | Adopting a genealogical methodology, this paper aims to unveil the historical intricacies of civil disobedience’s many conceptualizations, particularly the ones related to the Thoureaivian concept and the liberal model of civil disobedience. As suggested by Hanson, there has been a long process of selective appropriation of Thoreau’s Resistance to civil government - later republished as Civil disobedience - that goes from the editors until Gandhi. By the same token, there has been a second process, not of selective appropriation per se, but of colonization in which the authors of the liberal model of civil disobedience imposes a series of theoretical constraints in the form of constitutive elements that ought to be fulfilled in order for a political movement to be considered a legitimate case of civil disobedience. This has resulted in civil disobedients being required to recognize the legitimacy of legal and political systems and to demand changes only within the boundaries of the rule of law. Conversely, we suggest a different – and radical – approach to civil disobedience, one that acknowledges that civil disobedience’s conceptualization should be practical-base, i.e., determined from real political actions and not necessarily centered on legal foundations or normative status. |
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