| Sumario: | The Hegelian philosophy did not assume, from the beginning, the roleof a critical metaphysics. The gradual transition to a defense of a sciencethat has the potential to integrate critical and systematical thinking canexplain the ambiguous position occupied by the Phenomenology of Spiritwithin the dialectical system. At the beginning, the Phenomenology adoptedthe function initially reserved to the Logic, at the period of Iena, thatmeans, it was conceived as a critical-propaedeutical knowledge concerningthe system of philosophy as a whole. But the Phenomenology of 1807 hasto be thought as more than a mere propaedeutic: it has to include thefirst level of the justification of the concept, the principle of the system ofphilosophy. If this is the case, why has Hegel subsequently supposed thatit was possible to displace the Phenomenology from its original positionin the system, from a critical introduction to the Logic to a member ofthe Philosophy of Subjective Spirit? This paper defends the thesis thatthe reason of this displacement has to do with the defense, for the mature Hegel, of the radical autarkical character of the process of self-justificationof the concept developed in the Logic. The paper also intends to exposeand criticize the Hegelian thesis of the autarkical character of the Logic,with a renewed view of the relation between the Phenomenology of Spiritand the Logic in the context of a renewed conception of the dialecticalthinking.
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