Consciousness and Brain: Explanatory Gap and Ontological Gap.
The question I have proposed to reflect on in this article is whether, and if so, in what terms, a non-reductionist and interactionist physicalist approach explains the relationship between consciousness and brain. For that, I took as a guiding thread the problem of the explanatory gap, which was fa...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
| Repositorio: | Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.unesp.br:11449/302970 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2023.v46esp1.p277 https://hdl.handle.net/11449/302970 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Brain Consciousness Explanatory gap Ontological gap |
| Sumario: | The question I have proposed to reflect on in this article is whether, and if so, in what terms, a non-reductionist and interactionist physicalist approach explains the relationship between consciousness and brain. For that, I took as a guiding thread the problem of the explanatory gap, which was faced with the problem of the ontological gap, which involves two intertwined issues: 1. Does the existence of an explanatory gap implies the existence of an ontological gap? 2. Does the nonexistence of an ontological gap imply the nonexistence of an explanatory gap? I believe this reflection is welcome, since these two perspectives, the epistemological and the ontological, are often confused, and not understood. |
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