Plotin and skepticism
There follows a conjunction of working hypotheses about the presence of sceptical arguments in the Enneads, especially tractate V 3 [49]. Scepticism appears in various arguments Plotinus levels against theses he criticizes. Such theses are about: a. sense knowledge, taken as the source of true knowl...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2007 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR) |
| Repositorio: | Revista Dois Pontos (Curitiba. Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/8282 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.ufpr.br/doispontos/article/view/8282 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Ineffability sceptical doubt intellect truth Inefabilidade dúvida cética Intelecto verdade conhecimento de si |
| Sumario: | There follows a conjunction of working hypotheses about the presence of sceptical arguments in the Enneads, especially tractate V 3 [49]. Scepticism appears in various arguments Plotinus levels against theses he criticizes. Such theses are about: a. sense knowledge, taken as the source of true knowledge, whose questioning leads Plotinus to understand that truth does not rest in the sphere of the senses; b. the identity of the intellect and its content, in the intelligible plane; c. the questioning of the possibility of the divine intellect, in Aristotle's sense, being the first principle of reality; d. the problematic of the ineffability of the first principle. Our strategy will be to a. deal with some hypotheses about the structure of the intelligible and of the possibility of knowledge per se, identifying Plotinus' uses of such a structure and how it can be mobilized in the critique of the intellect, if regarded as a principle. From this problem b. follows: the identification of the presence of skepticism in the question of the fundamental negativity of the first ineffable principle, which denotes the absolute impossibility of introducing any relation of alterity and exteriority from our affections, in our discourse about the One. Such references to skepticism lead us consider its role, as modus operandi, in the interior of the Plotinian philosophical methodology. Our focus, therefore, is essentially methodological. |
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