Improvement of punishment practices and distal crime prevention: An alternative to skepticism about moral responsibility

In recent decades, the philosophical investigation of moral responsibility and free will, which for a long time was seen as a mostly theoretical enterprise, became also the place of more practically oriented concerns. The skeptical views developed by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso are a good illustr...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Fischborn, Marcelo
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2022
País:Brasil
Institución:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
Repositorio:Princípios (Natal. Online)
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/27258
Acceso en línea:https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/27258
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:moral responsibility
skepticism
punishment
penal reform
responsabilidade moral
ceticismo
punição
reforma penal
Descripción
Sumario:In recent decades, the philosophical investigation of moral responsibility and free will, which for a long time was seen as a mostly theoretical enterprise, became also the place of more practically oriented concerns. The skeptical views developed by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso are a good illustration of the change. In their work, they seek not just to defend the claim that we are not free and morally responsible agents (in a specific sense of the terms) but they also propose the reform of the way responsibility practices are actually implemented in our interpersonal relations and, specially, in the criminal justice system. This paper examines the practical implications of Pereboom and Caruso’s skepticism, particularly in what concerns its likelihood of being implemented. I argue that the strictly skeptical core of their proposal is not viable for human beings with a moral psychology like ours, but that nonetheless some elements are consistent with a non-skeptical view focused on the improvement of punitive practices.