"I'M NOT A ROBOT": what do language tests allow us to say about it?
In this paper, we argue that a Language Test is not sufficient for recognizing intelligence as an intrinsic property of both machines and human beings. We explain that defending the opposite stems from a Cartesian notion of "human nature," which leads to confusion between the ontological a...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2025 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
| Repositorio: | Pólemos (Brasília) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/55518 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/article/view/55518 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Testes de Linguagem Inteligência artificial Natureza humana René Descartes Alan Turing Language Testing Artificial Intelligence Human Nature |
| Sumario: | In this paper, we argue that a Language Test is not sufficient for recognizing intelligence as an intrinsic property of both machines and human beings. We explain that defending the opposite stems from a Cartesian notion of "human nature," which leads to confusion between the ontological and epistemic interpretations of these tests: it does not follow from the fact that "I know what I am" that "I know whether something is or is not like me." Thus, any Language Test aimed at identifying some ontological hallmark of humanity (rationality, thought, intentionality) presents this same issue, which ultimately leads to solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds. In order to avoid this outcome, we must either admit the possibility of the existence of strong Artificial Intelligence or accept that, counterintuitively, we may not know with maximum clarity and distinction whether we are human or machine. |
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