The pedagogical dimension of natural evil
The problem of evil is a topic that still attracts the attention of philosophers and theologians. The aim of this article is to offer a theoretical alternative based on Thomist philosophy to demonstrate the pedagogical aspect that natural evil provides for human beings. To this end, based on critica...
| Authors: | , |
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2024 |
| Country: | Brasil |
| Institution: | Antônio Meneghetti Faculdade (AMF) |
| Repository: | Saber Humano (Online) |
| Language: | Portuguese |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.saberhumano.emnuvens.com.br:article/711 |
| Online Access: | https://saberhumano.emnuvens.com.br/sh/article/view/711 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | natural evil problem of evil Thomas Aquinas mal natural problema del mal Tomás de Aquino problema do mal |
| Summary: | The problem of evil is a topic that still attracts the attention of philosophers and theologians. The aim of this article is to offer a theoretical alternative based on Thomist philosophy to demonstrate the pedagogical aspect that natural evil provides for human beings. To this end, based on critical philosophical research of a bibliographical nature, the first part will examine the concept of “gratuitous evil” listed by William Rowe, as well as the notion of the “good of the order of the universe” proposed by Thomas Aquinas. Secondly, we will try to understand that the process of generation and corruption in nature is something permitted by God by virtue of the good of the order of the universe. Finally, we will analyze the pedagogical process resulting from the evils that exist in nature. In this way, based on the research carried out, it can be concluded that not only will we be able to discuss the genesis of evil, but we will also be able to understand the entire educational process that it offers human beings in order to perfect their virtues and incline them towards their ultimate goal. Therefore, we will try to maintain that Rowe's proposition does not hold up, because what he calls gratuitous evil can be considered an evil secundum quid, therefore permitted by God in virtue of the good of the order of the universe. |
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