About eliminating the identity of logic
In this paper I will argue that one cannot claim without reservations that identity can be removed from logic as proposed by Wehmeier (2004). This is done by pointing out the very basic fact that identity is not a notion definable in the language of first order logic. As suggested by Béziau (2013),...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) |
| Repositorio: | Perspectiva Filosófica (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.periodicos.ufpe.br:article/248940 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/perspectivafilosofica/article/view/248940 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | identity dispensability arity logicality identidade dispensabilidade aridade logicidade |
| Sumario: | In this paper I will argue that one cannot claim without reservations that identity can be removed from logic as proposed by Wehmeier (2004). This is done by pointing out the very basic fact that identity is not a notion definable in the language of first order logic. As suggested by Béziau (2013), in first or-der logic we have at most Leibniz’s Identity— a congruence relation and not numerical identity. Therefore, it is argued, any attempt to dispense identity in terms of logical equivalence between languages of first order cannot suc-ceed. In addition, we present a metaphysical drawback in changing to the lo-gic advocated by Wehmeier (2004). |
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