Nietzsche e o naturalismo: a crítica ao ascetismo científico
The aim of this work is to understand the criticism of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche to scientific naturalism. Nietzsche, from the book Human, all too human, shows a growing interest in scientific research, establishing a philosophical project of naturalist bias, i.e, in line with the m...
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| Tipo de recurso: | tesis de maestría |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2009 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
| Repositorio: | Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.ufc.br:riufc/6503 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/6503 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Naturalism Asceticism Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 - Crítica e interpretação Naturalismo |
| Sumario: | The aim of this work is to understand the criticism of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche to scientific naturalism. Nietzsche, from the book Human, all too human, shows a growing interest in scientific research, establishing a philosophical project of naturalist bias, i.e, in line with the methods of science. Throughout his intellectual production, however, this initial attitude with regard to science will be aim of reflection, so that the works following the book Beyond good and evil, provide a scathing attack on the modern scientific enterprise. This paper seeks to show that this Nietzsche’s criticism is articulated from the understanding of modern sciences as heirs of the Greek epistemological ideal, the belief in the supreme value of truth, the will to truth, and that this belief undermines the scientific enterprise itself with an metaphysical and moral interpretation of the existence. We suggest, then, that Nietzsche’s criticism does not imply refusal to the whole scientific enterprise, but demand to reveal the problems hidden behind the scientific interpretations as they are in line with this moral value, and that the refusal of this value or, rather, its overrun, allow the achievement of a fully realized naturalism, which assumes the character irreducibly interpretative of its theories and propositions about the world. |
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