Inflation when the planner wants less spending
I study optima in a random-matching model of outside money. The examples in this paper show a conflict between private and collective interests. While the planner worry about the extensive and intensive margin effects of trades in a steady state, people want the exhaust the gains from trades immedia...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | tesis de maestría |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
| Repositorio: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/11600 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/10438/11600 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Monetary theory Mechanism design Inflation Heterogeneous agents Economia Moeda Política monetária Inflação |
| Resumo: | I study optima in a random-matching model of outside money. The examples in this paper show a conflict between private and collective interests. While the planner worry about the extensive and intensive margin effects of trades in a steady state, people want the exhaust the gains from trades immediately, i.e., once in a meeting, consumers prefer spend more for a better output than take the risk of saving money and wait for good meetings in the future. Thus, the conflict can force the planner to choose allocations with a more disperse money distribution, mainly if people are im- patient. When the patient rate is low enough, the planner uses a expansionary policy to generate a better distribution of money for future trades. |
|---|