Lender’s Environmental Liability in Brazil: How Much is Too Much? DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v6n1p128-151
This manuscript takes the Brazilian example and compares it to the U.S example with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) to demonstrate that when the right incentive is in place, Lender´s Environmental Liability (“LEL”) can be an effective tool to prom...
| Autores: | , , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2016 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) |
| Repositorio: | Economic Analysis of law Review |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/5781 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/5781 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | lender environmental liability Nash equilibrium |
| Sumario: | This manuscript takes the Brazilian example and compares it to the U.S example with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) to demonstrate that when the right incentive is in place, Lender´s Environmental Liability (“LEL”) can be an effective tool to promote precaution among all sectors of the economy. To illustrate our premise we created a model based on Nash’s Game Theory in an attempt to universalize some basic concepts regardless of how a domestic liability system is construed. Environmental harm and degradation is often irreparable to the status quo. Therefore, our assumption is that precaution is the main objective of any environmental international and domestic legal regime. By using Nash’s Game Theory we aim at answering the question presented in the title of our manuscript: how much is too much environmental liability for a financial institution to bear? |
|---|