Banking structure: opacity and specialization
We considered an economy where banks are coalitions of agents that, on the asset side, fund projects that are heterogeneous in terms of their opacity, and develop relationships with entrepreneurs; and on the liability side, meet the liquidity needs of their members by issuing securities backed by pr...
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| Tipo de recurso: | tesis de maestría |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
| Repositorio: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/35437 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10438/35437 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Banks Market structure Opacity Relationship Liquidity Bancos Estrutura de mercado Opacidade Liquidez Economia Liquidez (Economia) Equilíbrio econômico Clientes - Contatos |
| Sumario: | We considered an economy where banks are coalitions of agents that, on the asset side, fund projects that are heterogeneous in terms of their opacity, and develop relationships with entrepreneurs; and on the liability side, meet the liquidity needs of their members by issuing securities backed by projects. Banks are endogenously formed and there exists a unique core banking structure, exhibiting a negative relationship between the size of the bank and the intensity of its specialization, an equilibrium outcome that conforms with empirical evidence. We explore how changes in aggregate uncertainty and idiosyncratic uncertainty impacts the banking structure. |
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