The Epistemic Authority of Testimony
A great deal of what we know is derived from what other people report to us, though not everything other people say is apt to yield justified beliefs. The aim of this paper is to analyze the conditions under which testimony yields justified beliefs and knowledge. Assuming a non-reductionist view of...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2016 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
| Repositorio: | Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/24268 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/24268 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Testimony. Trust. Justification. Knowledge. Robert Audi. Confiança. Justificação conhecimento. Roberto Audi. |
| Sumario: | A great deal of what we know is derived from what other people report to us, though not everything other people say is apt to yield justified beliefs. The aim of this paper is to analyze the conditions under which testimony yields justified beliefs and knowledge. Assuming a non-reductionist view of testimony, we follow the persuasive contribution of Robert Audi so as to conclude that testimony is a legitimate source of justification and knowledge, arguing that trusting other people can, under certain circumstances, satisfy the conditions for justification and knowledge. |
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