“A Conviction about What is Moral or Lawful” Carl Schmitt on humanitarianism, the humanum, and the possibility of a “universal jus commune”
Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) spent much of his life arguing against human rights. While this may not come as a surprise, a closer examination of The Concept of the Political reveals that Schmitt’s critique of Liberal humanitarianism is itself rooted in a concept of the humanum as a sphere of substantive...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
| Repositorio: | Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/40279 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/40279 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Carl Schmitt Human rights Friend-enemy Foe Humanum Derechos humanos Amigo-enemigo Enemigo Direitos humanos Amigo-inimigo Inimigo |
| Sumario: | Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) spent much of his life arguing against human rights. While this may not come as a surprise, a closer examination of The Concept of the Political reveals that Schmitt’s critique of Liberal humanitarianism is itself rooted in a concept of the humanum as a sphere of substantive moral and political conflict. As an analysis of Schmitt’s concept of the enemy shows, this humanum serves as an argument for the necessity of a juristic distinction between enemy and foe. For, only by distinguishing between the relativized enemy and the absolute foe, Schmitt argues, will we be able to distinguish create a space for particularly political action. Having revealed the framework of mediated moral conflict, in which Schmitt conceives of political action, I then turn to consider Schmitt’s minimalist proposal for a positive definition of a “universal jus commune” and assess its significance for a discussion of human rights. |
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