NON-SUBSTANTIATING ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORIES AND THE THEORY OF LORENZ PUNTEL
This text presents theories that give alternatives to the substantialist theory of being, passing through Kant, Zemach, Williams, Frege, Lawe, and has its focus on Lorenz Puntel's categorical theory. In the search for the absolutely universal (or primordial) dimension of being, Puntel finds in...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
| Repositorio: | Pólemos (Brasília) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/29649 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/article/view/29649 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Ser Primordial. Existir. Categoria. Substância. Primordial Being. Exist. Category. Substance. |
| Sumario: | This text presents theories that give alternatives to the substantialist theory of being, passing through Kant, Zemach, Williams, Frege, Lawe, and has its focus on Lorenz Puntel's categorical theory. In the search for the absolutely universal (or primordial) dimension of being, Puntel finds in the meta-(...) particle the correspondence to what can be considered as the absolutely universal being. This stems from his logical-semantic reflection, which starts from the theoretical operator "is it the case", which is the universal meta-(...) particle before it. In fact, the absolutely universal particle, or being primordial, is presupposed by the theoretical operator, and here it is intended to deal with Puntel articulate and reach this conclusion, as it is also argued here that for Puntel such an absolutely universal particle does not have the predicate “exist” or “be determined”. |
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