JOHN RAWLS' OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS JUSTIFICATION
The aim of this article is to raise some considerations about the role of category of the overlapping consensus in John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness in Political Liberalism (Lecture IV), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (§ 11) and Replay to Habermas (§ 2), with...
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2008 |
| Country: | Brasil |
| Institution: | Universidade Federal de Goiás (UFG) |
| Repository: | Revista philósophos |
| Language: | Portuguese |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistas.ufg.br:article/4764 |
| Online Access: | https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/4764 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | consenso sobreposto justificação razão pública |
| Summary: | The aim of this article is to raise some considerations about the role of category of the overlapping consensus in John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness in Political Liberalism (Lecture IV), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (§ 11) and Replay to Habermas (§ 2), with a view to identifying a pragmatical justification model in a public scope, understanding the principles of justice for the basic structure of society as a social minimum that aims at the guarantee of the stability and legitimacy, assuring public criteria for the determination of the principal constitution, economic and social arrangements. With affirmation of the political values of the reasonableness and reciprocity, I’ll identify a pragmatical-universalist justification model with basis in a mitigated intuitionism. |
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