Nature and freedom in Ludwig Feuerbach

The article intends to highlight the thesis that nature for Feuerbach is an autonomous and independent existent, has primacy before the spirit and that it is the material basis of human freedom. For him, the material nature, which exists, in its qualitative differentiation, independent of thinking,...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Ferreira Chagas, Eduardo
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2025
País:Brasil
Institución:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)
Repositorio:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:periodicos.ufc:article/60310
Acceso en línea:http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/60310
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Natureza. Liberdade. Ética. Feuerbach.
Nature. Freedom. Ethics. Feuerbach.
Descripción
Sumario:The article intends to highlight the thesis that nature for Feuerbach is an autonomous and independent existent, has primacy before the spirit and that it is the material basis of human freedom. For him, the material nature, which exists, in its qualitative differentiation, independent of thinking, is the original, the non-deductible, immediate, uncreated foundation of all real existence. Feuerbach opposes nature to spirit, because he understands it not as a pure other, but, as the first, objective, material reality, which exists outside of understanding and is given to man through your senses as the foundation and essence of your life. This is also an exhibition of Ludwig Feuerbach’s materialistic, posterioristic ethics based on his critique of all a priori, transcendental, unlimited, indifferent, immediate, pure, contentless ethics, abstracted from determinations, from the concrete situation, based on a freedom, or will, unconditioned, undetermined, on an alleged human freedom independent of both the limits and laws of external nature, as well as internal nature, corporal determination and human natural needs. With this, however, in Feuerbach there is no determinism or denial of freedom, of will, but the defense that human freedom is not absolutely and unconditionally free, but conditioned by time, by the historical moment, by age, by means material and sensitive, due to the environmental situation, the conditions and circumstances of nature, such as food, clothing, light, air, water, space and time, because having a will is always having a will for something, since it is always a will mediated by an object, and it is only through conditions and mediations that freedom is achieved, and, thus, freedom, the will, becomes concrete.