Between penalists and neuroscientists: reflections on the influence of neuroscience studies on the legal-criminal concept of culpability
The present study addresses the influences of cognitive neuroscience in criminal law, more precisely in the concept of culpability as an element of crime. The problem lies in the fact that, while criminal dogmatics presupposes, for the characterization of guilt and, therefore, crime, the existence o...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Nove de Julho (UNINOVE) |
| Repositorio: | Revista Thesis Juris |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.periodicos.uninove.br:article/18147 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.uninove.br/thesisjuris/article/view/18147 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | criminal law culpability neuroscience direito penal culpabilidade neurociência |
| Sumario: | The present study addresses the influences of cognitive neuroscience in criminal law, more precisely in the concept of culpability as an element of crime. The problem lies in the fact that, while criminal dogmatics presupposes, for the characterization of guilt and, therefore, crime, the existence of a free individual, capable of acting in a way that is not deviant, neuroscientific studies show free will as an illusion. In view of this, we seek to verify to what extent the discoveries of neuroscience about free will influence culpability. To do so, it addresses, on the one hand, the understanding of neuroscientists, who deny the existence of free will, and, on the other, the understanding of penalists, who reject the idea of a human being determined by causal laws. |
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