Normative authority and the demands of morality: an analysis of Denis Coitinho’s hybrid theory

The paper aims to evaluate the strength of the thesis defended by Denis Coitinho that public morality and private morality have normatively distinct natures. Recently, Coitinho (2021) argued that monist theories cannot explain the complexity of morality because they do not consider the normative dua...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Dalsotto, Lucas Mateus
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:Brasil
Institución:Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)
Repositorio:Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online)
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/44382
Acceso en línea:https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/44382
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:hybrid moral theory
normative authority
public morality
private morality.
teoría moral híbrida
autoridad normativa
moralidad pública
moralidad privada.
teoria moral híbrida
autoridade normativa
moralidade pública
moralidade privada.
Descripción
Sumario:The paper aims to evaluate the strength of the thesis defended by Denis Coitinho that public morality and private morality have normatively distinct natures. Recently, Coitinho (2021) argued that monist theories cannot explain the complexity of morality because they do not consider the normative duality of ethics. By treating moral reasoning as an all-or-nothing matter, they ignore that public morality’s normative authority is intersubjective and private morality’snormative authority is subjective. Despite the attractiveness of Coitinho’s proposal, I discuss four points that deserve a more detailed investigation. First, the normative authority of the private sphere excludes the possibility of directing arational critique to the set of desires and interests of an agent. Then, I show that taking Dworkin’s work on integrity as an example can be problematic considering the purposes of Coitinho’s project. Integrity is better seen as an epistemic virtue than a private one. Finally, I explore scenarios in which the thesis of the superiority of public over private normativity leads to counterintuitive consequences.