Language and thinking in classical greek philosophy

My aim is to point out the most relevant contributions of Classical Greek Philosophy to the study of the relations between Language and Thought. I see them expressed in the continuing task of conceptual innovation that has accompanied the classical Greek tradition from its inception. I begin with th...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Santos, José Gabriel Trindade
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2016
País:Brasil
Institución:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
Repositorio:Manuscrito (Online)
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8643590
Acceso en línea:https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643590
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Greek classical philosophy
Language
Thought.
Filosofia clássica grega
Linguagem
Pensamento.
Descripción
Sumario:My aim is to point out the most relevant contributions of Classical Greek Philosophy to the study of the relations between Language and Thought. I see them expressed in the continuing task of conceptual innovation that has accompanied the classical Greek tradition from its inception. I begin with the conception of Being, developed in the Parmenides Poem, showing how it corresponds to the execution of a program of investigation of the real, conceived from the evidence provided by language and thought. Particular attention is paid to the emergence of the conception of 'truth' implicit in B7.1 as a comment to B6. Platonic reception to the theory of Eleata is referred to in the Theories of Forms and Anamnesis and complemented by the problematic and critical revision of the Theteto and Sophist. Two structuring perspectives of the real are defined, the first supported by the conceptual range derived from the analysis of the Greek verb 'to be' (einai): 'to be', 'essence', 'existence', 'substance', 'entity' , “One”, “all / all”; the second refined by the critique of thought and the disambiguation of einai's senses. I conclude with Aristotle's critique of Platonic conceptions, expressed in his conception of Being, as “said in many ways”, supported by the articulating theories of thought, language and Being: of the construction of the universal, from experience; and meaning. In addition to introducing the distinctions of “Substance First / Second” (see 'individual' and 'universal') and 'essence / existence', in the treatises on language the Stagyrite fixes the concepts of 'name', 'discourse', “Proposition”, “truth / falsehood”, refining conceptions spread in Platonic dialogues.