The Naturalistic Fallacy and Searle’s Derivation
In this article we intend to characterize the issue of the so-called naturalistic fallacy and to evaluate how John Searle approaches it. To do this, we will briefly approach the arguments of David Hume and G. E. Moore and then analyze how Searle's objections to the alleged fallacy relate to suc...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) |
| Repositorio: | Perspectiva Filosófica (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.periodicos.ufpe.br:article/248960 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/perspectivafilosofica/article/view/248960 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | ought/is John Searle naturalism naturalistic fallacy metaethics dever/ser naturalismo falácia naturalista metaética |
| Resumo: | In this article we intend to characterize the issue of the so-called naturalistic fallacy and to evaluate how John Searle approaches it. To do this, we will briefly approach the arguments of David Hume and G. E. Moore and then analyze how Searle's objections to the alleged fallacy relate to such approaches and if have been successful. |
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