Suspensão e neutralidade evidencial
In this paper I discuss a certain thesis about the rationality of suspended judgment, to wit, that rational suspension requires evidential neutrality. After making some preliminary points about the probabilistic notion of evidential neutrality and evidential support, I direct the reader’s attention...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) |
| Repositorio: | Perspectiva Filosófica (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.periodicos.ufpe.br:article/247944 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/perspectivafilosofica/article/view/247944 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | suspended judgment epistemic rationality evidential neutrality suspensão de juízo racionalidade epistêmica neutralidade evidencial |
| Sumario: | In this paper I discuss a certain thesis about the rationality of suspended judgment, to wit, that rational suspension requires evidential neutrality. After making some preliminary points about the probabilistic notion of evidential neutrality and evidential support, I direct the reader’s attention to an important consequence of these notions: that entailment by evidence makes for lack of neutrality. Next, I present an objection to the aforementioned thesis that deploys that consequence. There is a relevant concept of epistemic rationality, however, that makes the thesis immune to that objection. Finally, I will make some points about the functional role and instrumental value of suspended judgment. These points allow us to explain what is the positive value of suspending judgment about the truth of a given proposition even when the subject’s evidence completely settles whether that proposition is true or false. |
|---|