On suffering (leiden) and compassion (mitleiden) in Nietzsche's critique of Schopenhauerian moral philosophy
This paper has as main objective to understand Nietzsche’s critics in The Antichrist of Schopenhauer’s moral thought through the general approach of fragments 7, 8 and 9 of this same book, in which the moral of compassion (Mitleiden) (guided by the denial of will to life) is viewed as a mortifying...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
| Repositorio: | Voluntas - Revista Internacional de Filosofia (Santa Maria) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/87851 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/87851 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Compaixão Moralidade Vontade de potência Compassion Morality will to power |
| Sumario: | This paper has as main objective to understand Nietzsche’s critics in The Antichrist of Schopenhauer’s moral thought through the general approach of fragments 7, 8 and 9 of this same book, in which the moral of compassion (Mitleiden) (guided by the denial of will to life) is viewed as a mortifying and harmful feeling. According to Nietzsche’s comments, it can be understood that compassion, as a shared feeling of suffering, is negative because of 1) its unnatural constituent, 2) its tendency to reduce and erase individual characteristics of individual experiences of suffering, potentially transformative and constructive, and 3) its constant denying of conflict as part of the affirmation of life. |
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