Government coalition: an alternative concentration indicator
In the last 30 years, no Brazilian president has had a majority of congress members in the party that elected him/her. In order to have support in the legislature, their strategy has been to form a government coalition with other parties. The literature indicates that the main currency used by presi...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
| Repositorio: | Cadernos Gestão Pública e Cidadania (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/65099 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.fgv.br/cgpc/article/view/65099 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Coalescence rate G Index coalition party discipline coalitional presidentialism. Tasa de coalescencia coalición Índice de G disciplina partidaria presidencialismo de coalición. Taxa de Coalescência Índice G coalizão disciplina partidária presidencialismo de coalizão |
| Sumario: | In the last 30 years, no Brazilian president has had a majority of congress members in the party that elected him/her. In order to have support in the legislature, their strategy has been to form a government coalition with other parties. The literature indicates that the main currency used by presidents is the distribution of ministries, and that this division is proportional to the number of members of each party in the coalition. The presupposition to this theme is that proportional parliaments would be more satisfied, and would therefore act in a more regulated manner because of their sense of justice. The main indicator used to measure the distribution of ministries is the Coalescence Rate. This paper argues that this index has no statistical consistency, and suggests an alternative concentration indicator: the G. Index. |
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