Judgment, truth and reality in F. H. Bradley
What does the truth of a judgment consist of, according to F. H. Bradley? What is its ultimate nature? In particular, how does such a property relate to reality? At least three interpretive theses have been offered: (i) that Bradley defended a theory of truth as coherence; (ii) that, rather, Bradley...
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2023 |
| Country: | Brasil |
| Institution: | Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
| Repository: | Trans/Form/Ação (Online) |
| Language: | Spanish |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.www2.marilia.unesp.br:article/15708 |
| Online Access: | https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/15708 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Juicio Realidad Verdad Bradley Judgment Reality True Julgamento Realidade Verdade |
| Summary: | What does the truth of a judgment consist of, according to F. H. Bradley? What is its ultimate nature? In particular, how does such a property relate to reality? At least three interpretive theses have been offered: (i) that Bradley defended a theory of truth as coherence; (ii) that, rather, Bradley defended a robust variant of the identity theory of truth; and (iii) that, in any case, Bradley rejected the correspondence theory of truth. In this article I question these three theses and argue that the position defended by Bradley is perfectly compatible with a weak variant of the correspondence theory of truth. This, by the way, makes his position vulnerable to certain objections. Bradley's merit consists not so much in having answered them satisfactorily as in having anticipated them and assumed them as eventual consequences of his position. |
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