SHADOW OF A DOUBT: REFLEXIVITY AND EPISTEMIC CLOSURE
The paper discusses the relations between two putative epistemic principles, Reflexivity and Closure, with a view to assess whether the repudiation of the former, usually required by externalistic accounts of knowledge, necessitates the repudiation, as well, of the latter. A negative reply to that q...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2010 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Goiás (UFG) |
| Repositorio: | Revista philósophos |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistas.ufg.br:article/11262 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/11262 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Skepticism Epistemic Principles Closure Rationality Reflexivity Moore’s Paradox. Ceticismo Princípios Epistêmicos Fechamento Epistêmico Racionalidade Reflexividade Paradoxo de Moore. |
| Sumario: | The paper discusses the relations between two putative epistemic principles, Reflexivity and Closure, with a view to assess whether the repudiation of the former, usually required by externalistic accounts of knowledge, necessitates the repudiation, as well, of the latter. A negative reply to that question is offered, which prompts the hypothesis that alleged counterexamples to Closure are artifacts of the rather peculiar conditions on which, in the course of a particular kind of epistemological inquiry, are introduced assumptions such as are characteristic of the methodological use of so-called skeptical “doubts”. |
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