Radically Enactive High Cognition
In this paper, I advance the radical enactivist program by developing Hutto & Satne’s (2015) and Hutto & Myin’s (2017) idea that contentful cognition emerges through sociocultural activities, which require a contentless form of intentionality. Radical enactivists then face two relate...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Pelotas (UFPEL) |
| Repositorio: | Dissertatio - Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.ufpel:article/12390 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/index.php/dissertatio/article/view/12390 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Radical enactivism embodied cognition reflection autopoietic enactivism social systems. Enativismo Radical Cognição Corporificada Enativismo Autopoiético Sistemas Sociais. |
| Sumario: | In this paper, I advance the radical enactivist program by developing Hutto & Satne’s (2015) and Hutto & Myin’s (2017) idea that contentful cognition emerges through sociocultural activities, which require a contentless form of intentionality. Radical enactivists then face two related challenges: (a) how could we explain the characteristic procedures of higher cognition – such as being able to reflect upon one’s own cognitive performances? And (b) what is the function of higher cognitive skills, given the empirical findings that engaging in higher-cognitive activities does not imply cognitive amelioration (Kornblith, 2012)? I answer the first question by construing reflective activities as assessments of possibilities of engagement, whereas these possibilities are mandated by one’s own mental states. I answer the second question by arguing that higher cognition is an adaptive tool of the social systems we are embedded in, therefore, it is not necessarily aimed at achieving better cognitive states. |
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