A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente
This text is intended to present a critique of the philosopher John Searle on Artificial Intelligence, more specifically to what Searle calls Strong Artificial Intelligence. For this, the main researched and scrutinized text will be your 1980 s article, Minds, brains and programs, in which is presen...
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| Tipo de recurso: | tesis de maestría |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal da Paraíba (UFPB) |
| Repositorio: | Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.ufpb.br:tede/5646 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5646 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Inteligência artificial Consciência Argumento do quarto chinês artificial intelligence consciousness chinese room argument CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
| Sumario: | This text is intended to present a critique of the philosopher John Searle on Artificial Intelligence, more specifically to what Searle calls Strong Artificial Intelligence. For this, the main researched and scrutinized text will be your 1980 s article, Minds, brains and programs, in which is presented his chinese room argument. The argument seeks to show that it is not possible to duplicate the mind by purely formal processes, namely the manipulation of numbers 0 and 1 in a computer program that could be executed on any computer with a capable hardware to run this type of program. Therefore, it is suggested by Searle a thought experiment involving what he calls the "chinese room", which aims to demonstrate that even a computer running a program that involves the ability of understanding can never understand anything, since in his thought experiment, the same computational processes would be emulated in a different environment (the room, which will be equivalent to the computer), by a human being (which would be equivalent to the program on the computer) and still would not have been possible to state some understanding (in this case, the Chinese language), nor by the room neither by the man who would be within the room performing the same processes as a computer running a program accomplish, according Searle. Through exposure of that argument and criticism of Searle to Strong Artificial Intelligence, among other theories of the mind, such as the computationalism and functionalism, we will seek to achieve the understanding of what would be the contribution of Searle for the Philosophy of Mind with regard to discussions on Artificial Intelligence, analyzing both the argument as its criticism and the strengths and weaknesses of Searle s argumentation. |
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