The myth of knowledge
In “The Myth of Knowledge” Laurence Bonjour defends the thesis that the “fallibilist” conception of knowledge, assumed by most epistemologists in the post-Gettier era, “is wrong” – such a “weak” concept of knowledge provides little philosophical satisfaction, and is non-existent in common sense, thu...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
| Repositorio: | Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/22018 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/22018 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Knowledge. Fallibilism. Cartesianism. Conhecimento. Falibilismo. Cartesianismo. Justificação Epistêmica |
| Sumario: | In “The Myth of Knowledge” Laurence Bonjour defends the thesis that the “fallibilist” conception of knowledge, assumed by most epistemologists in the post-Gettier era, “is wrong” – such a “weak” concept of knowledge provides little philosophical satisfaction, and is non-existent in common sense, thus constituting only a “philosophical myth”. |
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