O gênio maligno cartesiano como expressão da equipolência pirrônica

The present article aims to establish a comparison between the Cartesian evil genius and one of the most fundamental precepts of Pyrrhonian skepticism, namely equipollence. Setting aside issues related to Cartesian sources concerning skepticism, the goal is to draw a parallel between the role played...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Borba, Maíra de Souza
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2025
País:Brasil
Institución:Universidade Federal de Goiás (UFG)
Repositorio:Revista philósophos
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:ojs.revistas.ufg.br:article/81581
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/81581
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Descartes, ceticismo, gênio maligno, probabilidade, equipolência.
Descripción
Sumario:The present article aims to establish a comparison between the Cartesian evil genius and one of the most fundamental precepts of Pyrrhonian skepticism, namely equipollence. Setting aside issues related to Cartesian sources concerning skepticism, the goal is to draw a parallel between the role played by the evil genius in the Meditations and the Pyrrhonian equipollence. To this end, a counterpoint is established with the notion of probability, which is fundamental to Academic skepticism. The intention is to reveal a new way of understanding the evil genius that, contrary to the tendency to interpret it as a point of divergence between Descartes and skepticism, establishes it as a point of convergence.  This interpretation is grounded primarily through the concepts of equipollence, suspension of judgment and probability.