Can there be a plural acceptance of the rule of recognition? Notes on Kevin Toh’s expressivist analysis of Hart’s internal legal statements
One of the most intriguing answers to Dworkin’s argument from theoretical disagreements is Kevin Toh’s expressivist analysis of Hartian internal legal statements. Nonetheless, the rule of recognition’s conventional character and the existence of a unique, though complex, social rule accepted by the...
| Autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
| Repositorio: | Ethic@ - Revista Internacional de Filosofia da Moral |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/86707 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/86707 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | H.L.A. Hart Expressivism Rule of recognition Kevin Toh Ronald Dworkin Theoretical disagreement |
| Sumario: | One of the most intriguing answers to Dworkin’s argument from theoretical disagreements is Kevin Toh’s expressivist analysis of Hartian internal legal statements. Nonetheless, the rule of recognition’s conventional character and the existence of a unique, though complex, social rule accepted by the officials are crucial for Hart’s jurisprudence. This new reading comes with too high a price, since in the end it requires one to depart from the Hartian account which is the base of Toh’s argument. Without that theoretical framework, legal positivism cannot account for theoretical disagreements in law. |
|---|