INDEPENDENT AUDIT AND ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) DISCLOSURE
Disclosure of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) information, on the one hand, reduces certainties and certainly minimizes agency costs. On the other hand, it can disguise opportunistic behaviors by managers, who may start to escape these practices for personal benefits. Thus, one can obser...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Centro Universitário Christus (Unichristus) |
| Repositorio: | Revista Gestão em Análise (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.emnuvens.com.br:article/4673 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/gestao/article/view/4673 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | ESG agency theory independent audit auditoria independente teoria da agência |
| Resumo: | Disclosure of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) information, on the one hand, reduces certainties and certainly minimizes agency costs. On the other hand, it can disguise opportunistic behaviors by managers, who may start to escape these practices for personal benefits. Thus, one can observe the positive or negative effects of ESG information depending on the interests of the agents involved in its disclosure. One way to minimize these conflicts is through audit work. Thus, the essay aims to discuss the role of independent auditing in ESG information evidenced by entities in the light of Agency Theory. |
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