Freedom, recognition and social criticism: on the 'loss of ethical life' in Hegel
The present paper has the broader objective of sustaining the idea that Hegel's notion of reciprocal recognition constitutes the mediation between his theory of freedom and the potential of his philosophy for social criticism. In the first part, I would like to reconstruct dimensions of the rec...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
| Repositorio: | Ethic@ - Revista Internacional de Filosofia da Moral |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/95623 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/95623 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | G.W.F Hegel Reconhecimento Liberdade Eticidade Crítica Social Recognition Freedom Ethical Life Social Criticism |
| Resumo: | The present paper has the broader objective of sustaining the idea that Hegel's notion of reciprocal recognition constitutes the mediation between his theory of freedom and the potential of his philosophy for social criticism. In the first part, I would like to reconstruct dimensions of the recent debate that seeks to recover the notion of recognition in the context of the Philosophy of Right. The main intention here is to develop the idea that there is in Hegel a transformation of the notion of autonomy into the model of reciprocal recognition, as well as to highlight some of the most fruitful consequences of this modification (1). Then, resuming the main stages of Honneth's theoretical path, I try to emphasize, based on Die Armut unserer Freiheit (2020), the hermeneutical advantages of a concentration on the notion of 'objective freedom' in Hegel, also exploring the differences between Honneth and Brandom's 'expressivism' (2). Based on considerations about the 'objective' dimension of freedom, I then propose a discussion that seek to clarify §§ 21-24 of the Philosophy of Right from an explanation of the normative consequences of the model of recognition, undertaken by Hegel in the Phenomenology (3). Finally, after connecting the normative implications of recognition to the 'loss of ethical life', I conclude with a discussion on Hegel's diagnosis of modern society (4). |
|---|