Derecho a equivocarse: excusas e inocencia epistémica
If a subject S attributes knowledge ignoring available evidence, then S will not be guilty of such attribution and, therefore, will not be epistemically irresponsible, when: (a) he is not aware of his own ignorance and (b) those who judge him, explicitly or implicitly, they put themselves in his pla...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
| Repositorio: | Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.ufc.br:riufc/53419 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/53419 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Desculpas epistêmicas Inocência Pragmatismo Atribuições de conhecimento |
| Resumo: | If a subject S attributes knowledge ignoring available evidence, then S will not be guilty of such attribution and, therefore, will not be epistemically irresponsible, when: (a) he is not aware of his own ignorance and (b) those who judge him, explicitly or implicitly, they put themselves in his place and acknowledge that they would not be aware of his ignorance. In this paper the application of such a principle will be defended, not only with regard to the attributions of knowledge in ordinary contexts, but also with regard to the most demanding contexts. |
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