THE BADNESS OF DEATH AND THE CHALLENGE OF TIME
In this article, we intend to explore the comparativist thesis about the badness of death and how it deals with the so-called Challenge of Time. According to comparativism, death can be an evil insofar as the person would be better off had he not died. However, if when we die we cease to exist, how...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) |
| Repositorio: | Princípios (Natal. Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/31669 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/31669 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Death Harm Comparativism Challenge of Time Morte Dano Comparativismo Desafio do Tempo |
| Sumario: | In this article, we intend to explore the comparativist thesis about the badness of death and how it deals with the so-called Challenge of Time. According to comparativism, death can be an evil insofar as the person would be better off had he not died. However, if when we die we cease to exist, how can death be something bad? More specifically, at what point does death harm the subject? To answer this question, we will first explain what exactly the comparativist thesis consists of, and how it can argue for some prudential value of death. Next, we will explain what the challenge of time is and, finally, we will analyze the answers provided by the comparativists to the problem. We will thus seek to defend that comparativism can not only say whether a death is bad, but also how bad it can be for the individual and, in addition, that this approach proposes plausible solutions to the challenge of time. |
|---|