Tres trampas: sobre los orígenes de la crisis económica mexicana de 1994
ln ali developing countries facing economic reform there are política! and economic obstacles to such a radical change. ln the case ofMexico, however, during the Salinas administration ( 1988-94 ), a new economic crisis exploded after serious changes had taken place and the economy seemed to have st...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1998 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | EDITORA 34 |
| Repositorio: | Revista de Economia Política |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs2.centrodeeconomiapolitica.org:article/2241 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journal/article/view/2241 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Currency crisis economic history of Mexico Mexican peso crisis Crise cambial história econômica do México Crise econômica do México de 1994 |
| Sumario: | ln ali developing countries facing economic reform there are política! and economic obstacles to such a radical change. ln the case ofMexico, however, during the Salinas administration ( 1988-94 ), a new economic crisis exploded after serious changes had taken place and the economy seemed to have stabilized and was prepared for continuous growth under a new development strategy. By the end of the six year presidential period, the old cycle of boom and bust returned. This article seeks to understand why has the Mexican economy ended in two of the last three presidential periods with an overvalued exchange rate, high deficits ofthe current account, unsustainable short term debt, anda financial crisis. The article focuses on the Salinas administration, but shows that a similar logic led to economic crisis in the Echeverría ( 1970-76) and López Portillo ( 1976-82) administrations. lt is argued that the 1994 crisis is the result of three traps: an international context which allowed a masive entrance of capital flows, the ideology ofthe state elite, and the incentives provided by the institutional framework. These three traps were also present in the previous two crisis. JEL Classification: N26; E52; E58; F62. |
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