KANT, CARNAP, PLANTINGA AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SYNTHETIC A PRIORI JUDGEMENTS: a essentialist defence of the existence of two types of necessary truths
The purpose of this article is consider the Carnap’s objections at the intelligibility of the concept of synthetic a priori judgements, elaborated by Kant in the Critique of pure reason. For this, will be analysed the Kantian understanding of the a priori syntheticity, distinguishing two necessity t...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
| Repositorio: | Pólemos (Brasília) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/38528 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/article/view/38528 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Sintético a priori. Necessidade. Kant. Carnap. Synthetic a priori. Necessity. Kant. Carnap. |
| Sumario: | The purpose of this article is consider the Carnap’s objections at the intelligibility of the concept of synthetic a priori judgements, elaborated by Kant in the Critique of pure reason. For this, will be analysed the Kantian understanding of the a priori syntheticity, distinguishing two necessity types in the Kant’s theoretical work: that of analytical truths and that of synthetic a priori truths. Instead, will be worked the Carnap’s idea that all necessity is logic or analytical, excluding the possibility of necessary propositions that are synthetic a priori judgements. Thus, from the analysis of the works by Kant and Carnap, as well as of commentators as Hanna (2004) and Loparic (2005), will be defended the possibility of the synthetic a priori judgements, but without the commitment with the explanation given by the Kantian transcendental idealism, considering plausible the essentialist perspective by Plantinga (1974) and by Moreland and Craig (2021). |
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