Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction
In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question 'why do bidders drop out,' we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenousl...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2000 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
| Repositorio: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/377 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/377 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Sequential auctions Endogenous participation Economia Leilões |
| Sumario: | In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question 'why do bidders drop out,' we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this model. Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this model. |
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