CORRESPONDENCE THEORIES OOF TRUTH
The aim of this paper is to discuss two versions and some main problems concerning the correspondence theories of truth (CR). We wish here to focus primarily at the fact-based contemporary versions of CRs. In this area, there’s still a bifurcation concerning the two main variations of the CRs. The f...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
| Repositorio: | Pólemos (Brasília) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/29581 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/article/view/29581 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Teorias da verdade como correspondência. Realismo alético. Bertrand Russell. John Austin. Correspondence Theories of Truth. Alethic Realism. Bertrand Russell. John Austin. |
| Sumario: | The aim of this paper is to discuss two versions and some main problems concerning the correspondence theories of truth (CR). We wish here to focus primarily at the fact-based contemporary versions of CRs. In this area, there’s still a bifurcation concerning the two main variations of the CRs. The first of them gives an account of the correspondence relation in terms of congruence, the second, in terms of correlation. We’ll thus try to articulate the specificities of each one as portraited in Russell’s and Austin’s versions of correspondence theories, which are taken as paradigmatically representing this distinction, respectively. Our final goal is also to discuss some implications and objections often raised to CRs and its theorists. |
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