Fallibilism is Omega-inconsistent
Peirce’s fallibilism is generally lauded. Little attention has been paid to its appearance of being self-contradictory. That appearance is nonetheless not easily removed. I make an effort to minimize its impact by drawing an analogy of it to ω-inconsistency, in contradistinction to simple inconsiste...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2013 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
| Repositorio: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13553 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13553 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Belief Consistency Fallibilism Ω-inconsistency Crença Consistência Falibilismo Ω-inconsistência |
| Sumario: | Peirce’s fallibilism is generally lauded. Little attention has been paid to its appearance of being self-contradictory. That appearance is nonetheless not easily removed. I make an effort to minimize its impact by drawing an analogy of it to ω-inconsistency, in contradistinction to simple inconsistency. But that stratagem proves to be illuminating only by way of revealing the limitations of formal analyses of belief. |
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