Moore’s paradox and the logic of belief
Moore’s Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account purports to offer an explanation of the paradox. In this paper I...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
| Repositorio: | Manuscrito (Online) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8661003 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8661003 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Moore's paradox Logic of belief Hintikka Epistemic logic Paradoja de Moore Lógica de la creencia Lógica epistémica Paradoxo de Moore Lógica de crença Lógica epistêmica |
| Sumario: | Moore’s Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account purports to offer an explanation of the paradox. In this paper I argue that Hintikka’s interpretation of one of the doxastic operators is philosophically problematic and leads to an unnecessarily Strong logical system. I offer a weaker alternative that captures in a more accurate way our logical intuitions about the notion of belief without sacrificing the possibility of providing an explanation for problematic cases such as Moore’s Paradox. |
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