Some cracks on Bas van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism
Bas van Fraassen' Constructive empiricism was thought as an anti-realist position that avoids any ontological commitment to undesirable metaphysical entities and is deeply divorced from both the scientific realism and logical positivism. In this paper, I claim that the only way the author finds...
| Autor: | |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2015 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM) |
| Repositorio: | Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online) |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.uem.br/ojs:article/26822 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/26822 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | scientific antirealism scientific realism metaphysics. antirrealismo científico realismo científico metafísica. Empirismo Constructivo |
| Sumario: | Bas van Fraassen' Constructive empiricism was thought as an anti-realist position that avoids any ontological commitment to undesirable metaphysical entities and is deeply divorced from both the scientific realism and logical positivism. In this paper, I claim that the only way the author finds to achieve that goal is to adopt a particular type of empiricism which, unfortunately, has some cracks that allow filtration of metaphysics. The positivist's anti-metaphysic empiricism is replaced by a new kind of empiricism who inadvertently makes some concessions to metaphysics. The outcome is that the author's position is closer to realism he always rejected. |
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