Knowing what I have done

The literature on agentive or practical knowledge tends to be focused on knowing what one is doing or what one is going to do. Knowing what one has done and has achieved thereby seems to be another matter. In fact, achievements are often taken to be beyond the ken of practical knowledge. I argue tha...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor: Haase, Mathias
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2018
País:Brasil
Recursos:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
Repositorio:Manuscrito (Online)
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8654148
Acesso em linha:https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654148
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Practical knowledge. Intentional action. Action and time. Anscombe.
Descrição
Resumo:The literature on agentive or practical knowledge tends to be focused on knowing what one is doing or what one is going to do. Knowing what one has done and has achieved thereby seems to be another matter. In fact, achievements are often taken to be beyond the ken of practical knowledge. I argue that this is a mistake. The intelligibility of the very idea of practical knowledge depends on the possibility of knowing one's achievements in the same manner. For if it is to be intelligible as knowledge of the actuality of one's action in the material world, knowing what one is doing has to include knowledge of what one has done so far.

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